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Benjamin Kelly
The coming of the Roman principate is often seen as marking a dramatic
change not only in political organization but also in the authorities’ capacity to
control riots in the city of Rome.1 From the dying days of the republic onward,
troops came to be used in the city to suppress rioting. Eventually, permanent
military forces were stationed in the capital.2 It has been pointed out that this
development raises a problem about the behaviour of the emperor in the city.3 On
the one hand, it is claimed, the authorities could easily crush riots4 using troops.
On the other, in Rome the emperor went to enormous lengths to maintain the
favour of the urban population.5 A similar problem could be raised in relation
to public benefactions bestowed by members of local e´lites in other garrisoned
cities. In part, the answers to such problems lie in the entrenched ideology of
euergetism,6 in the belief that the emperor should behave with comitas and civilitas
toward the lower classes (Wallace-Hadrill 1982), and in the preference during the
early principate for the formal participation of the plebs as a way of legitimizing
various parts of the political process (Millar 1998). Moreover, it is the contention
of this study that, at least at an abstract level, the e´lites of the empire were deeply
ambivalent about using force to control riots, and about the likely success of doing
so.
The numerous reports about riots contained in the sources often assume that
riot control could be a bloody and dangerous affair for soldiers as much as
for rioters, and that battles between rioters and soldiers could be enormously
destructive to the physical fabric of the city. Furthermore, the e´lites of the empire
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had a certain ambivalence toward the use of force against rioters. This ambivalence
was still deeper among the e´lites of the Greek East. And in cases of non-violent
demonstrations, ambivalence about the use of force turned to antipathy. Such
attitudes about using violence were in part the logical consequence of beliefs about
the human and material cost of riot repression. But they were also the natural
result of various more general ideals about the imperial power’s proper treatment
of its subjects. Thus, even if stationing troops in a city actually improved the
authorities’ capacity to quell riots, it was not clear to members of the e´lites of
the empire that those troops could and should be used to crush any riot or
demonstration.
Of course, to argue for an e´lite ambivalence toward the use of troops is not
to imply that the authorities in Rome and other cities were expected to remain
passive in the face of rioting. This study will suggest that our sources show
an expectation that the authorities should always do something in response to
rioting. The point is, however, that a response involving military force was
often considered inappropriate and counter-productive. This view in some sense
qualifies the recent suggestion that in practice Roman emperors, governors, and
magistrates only responded to riots when their own position, dignity, or authority
was threatened.7 It is conceivable that this was what happened in practice, thanks
to the limited nature of the resources that the Roman authorities had at their
disposal for such purposes. But, whatever the reality, e´lite expectations and ideals
were rather different.
i. reports about riots
One suspects that, on the subject of riot control during the Triumviral Period
and Roman principate,8 one can only generalize safely about e´lite expectations
and ideals. It is true that there is a sizeable modern literature which attempts to
understand the aetiology of Roman riots.9 There have also been several (rather
brief) attempts to enlist the sources to build a picture of how official responses to
riots varied according to the nature and context of the riot, and how successful
such responses were.10 This literature has tended to accept the sources’ reports
7 Nippel 1995: 90, 98, 110–112, cf. 83; Nippel 1988: 170, cf. 164. See too Erdkamp (2002:
115), who claims that the authorities tended not to respond violently to riots, except when the crowd
“threatened to interfere in an unstable situation.”
8 For the sake of manageability, this paper focuses on reports of riots that supposedly occurred
during the Triumviral Period and the principate, although this obviously involves an examination of
fourth-century sources at times. On occasion, however, particularly illuminating incidents from the
fourth century are examined.
9 Whittaker 1964; MacMullen 1966: 172; Yavetz 1969: 33–35; Africa 1971; Jory 1984: 63; Slater
1994; Rowe 2002: 98–101; Erdkamp 2002: 98–107.
10 On the question of the circumstances in which the authorities responded to rioting, see references
above, 151, n. 7. On the question of the success of military responses to riots, see references below,
167, n. 78.
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about riots more or less at face value.11 Such an approach has a number of
difficulties.
First, even when an extant report was written by an eyewitness (or a contem-
porary with access to eyewitnesses) its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. Riots are by
their nature chaotic occasions, so it is difficult even for unprejudiced eyewitnesses
to appreciate the exact course of events. In view of this, incorrect details may
easily be added (or important ones missed). Riots are also often ideologically
charged events, so unprejudiced witnesses are likely to be rare. One need only
consider here the various accounts of the suppression of C. Gracchus to see how
partisan sentiment could mould accounts of riots and their repression.12 Scholars
who have studied more recent riots have had to grapple with a similar problem.
For instance, in his study of the crowd in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
Britain and France, Rude´ notes that in these societies formal descriptions of riots
contained in texts such as contemporary memoirs and newspapers tend to report
events from the perspective of the aristocracy and middle class. For these periods
of history, however, there are many rather less partisan documentary sources such
as prison, hospital, and court records—sources which can go some way toward
correcting the distortions in accounts written by members of the more privileged
classes (Rude´ 1964: 11–12). In the case of Roman riots, the overwhelming
majority of extant contemporary accounts come from an e´lite perspective.13 This
is a significant impediment to our proper understanding of riots, which by their
nature involve conflict between the ruling e´lite and the masses. And, in contrast
to early modern Europe, documentary sources relevant to Roman riots simply
11 See Evans 1997 for a discussion of the treatment of sources by Nippel (1995).
12 The key texts are: App. B Civ. 1.24–26; Plut. C. Gracch. 13–17; Diod. Sic. 34/35.28a;
Vell. Pat. 2.6; Oros. 5.12. The accounts differ on Gracchus’ personal culpability in the death of
Antyllus/Antullius: Diodorus claims Gracchus ordered his killing, but Appian claims he was killed
by one of Gracchus’ over-zealous supporters, and Plutarch shows knowledge of different traditions.
There are differences on the question of whether the Gracchans possessed weapons at the time of
their occupation of the Aventine: Plutarch stresses that Gracchus was not armed apart from a dagger
and makes no mention of Gracchus’ supporters being armed, but the other sources all stress that
the Gracchans were armed. Descriptions of the nature of the forces employed by Opimius vary,
with Plutarch claiming they were heavy infantrymen and Cretan archers (i.e., mercenaries), Livy’s
epitomator claiming that Gracchus called the People to arms, and the other sources referring vaguely
to armed men of various sorts. There are many different versions of the death of Gracchus himself:
see Hillard and Beness 2001.
13 The majority of our ancient reports about riots, be they primary or secondary, come from
an “e´lite” perspective in that they were written by men who either are known to have taken part
in government and administration at an imperial or a local level (e.g., Tacitus, Cassius Dio, and
Herodian), or who came from wealthy families of the sort that were involved in local leadership, even
if they themselves held no formal political positions (e.g., Dio Chrysostom and Philo of Alexandria).
In a few cases, the personal origins of the writer are unknown, but his text makes it clear that he
shared in the literary culture of the e´lite, and hence is at least likely to have internalized e´lite attitudes
toward crowds and riots and their repression (e.g., Juvenal and the author[s] of the Historia Augusta).
This study will not examine in detail reports of riots emanating from a non-e´lite perspective (e.g., the
Christian martyr acts, and the apocryphal acts of the apostles).
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have not survived on a scale to serve to correct the e´lite perspective of the literary
texts.
A second problem with the extant reports about Roman riots stems from the
fact that most of them do not come from contemporary texts, but were written
decades or even centuries after the riots they describe. This raises the difficult
problems of what sources the authors of secondary accounts used, and how they
handled these sources. The majority of the extant secondary reports about Roman
riots are preserved in the writings of historians and biographers such as Tacitus,
Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. Such authors generally relied most heavily on literary
works written by other members of the e´lites of the empire.14 Oral traditions
were occasionally used, but these traditions would mostly have been transmitted
through the e´lite milieux of our extant authors (cf. Syme 1958: 176–177, 272–273,
299–303); indeed, our extant authors sometimes mention that a tradition was
transmitted through their very own families.15 Sometimes “documentary” sources
such as the acta Senatus, edicts, emperors’ speeches, and official inscriptions were
employed by narrative historians, but, as the Senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone patre
shows, documents need not be free of tendentiousness merely because they are
“official” (cf. Millar 1998: 134).16 There is no particular reason to believe that our
extant sources, when reporting riots, would have deviated from their usual habits
and employed sources with a more demotic perspective. Riots are occasionally
reported in sources emanating from a non-e´lite context: for instance, various riots
appear in the apocryphal Acts of apostles and the so-called Acta Alexandrinorum.17
But the extant e´lite literary authors, with one possible exception in Eusebius,
show no signs of having consulted sources of this sort (cf. Hist. eccl. 5.1.1–5.4.3).
In fact, extant secondary accounts only rarely attribute their information about a
riot to a source at all.18 It is interesting to notice in this context that a fragmentary
14 For general discussions about the use of sources by these authors, see Syme 1958: 176–190,
271–303 (for Tacitus); Millar 1964: 34–38 (for Cassius Dio); Wallace-Hadrill 1995: 61–66 and
Baldwin 1983: 101–213 (for Suetonius).
15 For example, Cass. Dio 69.1.3; Suet. Cal. 19.3, Otho 10.1; Plut. Ant. 28.2, 68.4–5.
16 Inscriptions were probably less relevant in the case of riots, since there are few contexts in which
an event as unfortunate as a riot would have been commemorated on stone (Erdkamp 2002: 96). A
few allusions to riots have been preserved epigraphically: S.C. de Cn. Pisone patre lines 155–158; I.Eph.
2.215 = I.Magnesia 114; TAM 4.1.3. Tacitus covers the first of these, the rioting surrounding the
trial of Piso. He probably had seen the text of the decrees passed after the trial of Piso (Griffin 1997:
258), but he clearly did not use them as the main source for his account of the riot (Ann. 3.14; cf. Eck
1996: 250–251). Edicts and letters written on perishable materials mentioning riots would perhaps
have occasionally been available to historians: cf. Joseph. AJ 19.280–285; Tcherikover and Fuks 1957:
nos. 153, 435.
17 For riots in the apocryphal acts, see below, 162, n. 55. See too PMich 8.477–478; CPJ 158a and
b; Benoıˆt and Schwartz 1948.
18 The few instances of such attributions are less than satisfactory. (1) Philostr. V A 5.26 attributes
an incident in which Apollonius discusses rioting in Alexandria to “Damis,” Apollonius’ supposed
companion and biographer; however, there are serious doubts about the existence of “Damis” and
Philostratus’ use of him as a source (cf. Jones 2001 and literature there); there are also doubts about
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specimen of the so-called Acta Alexandrinorum seems to describe a riot preceding
Caracalla’s massacre of the Alexandrians in 215 (Benoıˆt and Schwartz 1948). The
conventional historical texts mention no riot and present the act as a random
act of cruelty, suggesting that their version stemmed from an entirely different
tradition.19 And even if one could be sure of the origins of a report about a riot,
there is always the distinct possibility that the extant author has modified the
information. For example, it has been plausibly suggested that Herodian used
Cassius Dio’s account of the riots surrounding the fall of Cleander in 190, but
reworked it heavily to suit his own tastes.20 In short, then, the chances of our
secondary sources preserving anything other than an e´lite version of a given riot
are remote; indeed, these sources commonly describe the crowd’s behaviour with
abusive and snobbish language (Yavetz 1969: 141–155 with note 24 below).
A final problem is raised by the actual role played by reports about riots in
our historical sources. Mostly a riot is reported not because it is interesting in
itself, but because it is germane to the author’s discussion of high political history.
This means that most of the surviving reports about riots are fairly brief, and so
there is a good chance that even an author lacking tendentious intent omitted
details that might have altered our perception of the crowd’s behaviour or the
authorities’ response to the riot. This problem is illustrated by the frequency
with which different sources give accounts of the same riot which differ in key
details.21 Furthermore, most riots are reported in only one extant source, so one
cannot attempt to build a composite picture from several sources. Moreover, in
the historicity of the riot itself (cf. Barry 1993: 22 and literature there). (2) Euseb. Hist. eccl. 4.2.6
makes reference to Greek historians who wrote about the Jewish revolt of 115–117, but it is not
clear who these were or whether they wrote specifically about the rioting in Alexandria connected
with the revolt. (3) SHA Maximus et Balbinus 9.3 vaguely refers to a detail given by “others” (ut alii
dicunt) regarding a riot against Balbinus in 238. (4) Vict. Caes. 33.31 introduces details of the rioting
surrounding the fall of Gallienus in 268 with the unhelpful formula satis constat. (5) The author of
SHA Aurel. 39.2–4 purports to quote a letter written by Aurelian about the riot of the mint workers
during his reign, although whether this attribution is believable depends on one’s general view of the
reliability of the Historia Augusta. (6) Joseph. AJ 18.257 mentions the rioting between Greeks and
Jews in Alexandria which prompted Philo’s embassy to Gaius (cf. Philo In Flacc. and Leg.), and later
purports to quote an edict of Claudius which makes reference to these disorders (AJ 19.280–285).
However, he does not explicitly attribute his information in AJ 18.257 to this text, and one doubts
that this would have been his primary source of information about such a prominent event in Jewish
history.
19 Cass. Dio 78.22–23; Hdn. 4.8.6–9.8; SHA Caracalla 6.2–3.
20 Alfo¨ldy 1989. The key passages are Hdn. 1.12.3–1.12.9 and Cass. Dio 72.12.5–72.14.4.
21 For varying reports of the same riot, see: Cass. Dio 42.23.1–24.1, Caes. B Civ. 3.21 (on the
response of the senate and Servilius to Caelius’ incitement of a riot in 48 b.c.); Cass. Dio 48.31, App.
B Civ. 5.67–68, cf. Gowing 1992: 190 (a riot against Octavian and M. Antonius in 38 b.c.); Joseph.
BJ 2.223–227, AJ 20.105–112 (a riot in Jerusalem during the procuratorship of Ventidius Cumanus,
48–52); Suet. Claud. 18.2, Tac. Ann. 12.43 (a riot against Claudius in 51); Joseph. AJ 20.118–136,
BJ 2.232–246, Tac. Ann. 12.54 (the lynching of some Galilaean pilgrims in a Samaritan town in
52); Hdn. 1.12.3–9, Cass. Dio 72.12.5–14.4 (the riots leading to the fall of Cleander in 190); SHA
Did. Iul. 4.2–4.10, Cass. Dio 74.13.3–5 (the riots which greeted the accession of Didius Julianus in
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view of the political focus of most of our sources, it is possible that the riots
reported at greatest length are those which had the strongest ramifications for
political history (cf. Erdkamp 2002: 96–97). This means that claims about the
actual political preconditions for the military repression of riots should provoke
unease. We might expect, for instance, to find military responses recorded more
often for riots threatening the position of the emperor, simply because such riots
tend to be more fully reported.
Thus, reports of the repression and punishment of rioters cannot be taken as
sound evidence for what the authorities actually did in response to riots, or for
what actually happened when they dispatched troops to repress riots or responded
in some other way. One even doubts how useful these reports are in understanding
the aetiology of riots in the Roman world. At best they present us with a selection
of stereotypes about what caused riots.22 These stereotypes may not be entirely
untrue, but nevertheless they are likely to be tainted with class prejudice. They
are also likely to be naı¨ve, since the Romans lacked the analytical tools of the
modern sociologist. These reports are, however, useful for another purpose: they
reveal e´lite ideals concerning when and how riots should be repressed, and e´lite
expectations concerning what tended to happen when repression was attempted.
Such reports can be used to shed light on what Gruen (1998: 567) has described
as “the long neglected issue of what constitutes an acceptable level of public order
for the Romans and the means whereby to obtain it.” Examining the way in
which events are reported and the comments authors make about them reveals
something of such e´lite ideals and expectations, especially when reports are read
alongside more generalized statements concerning rioting and public order. It is
also instructive to study these reports as a body, so as to reveal recurrent motifs.23
In identifying such motifs, it is important to realize that we are not quite dealing
with rhetorical topoi.24 But we do find common motifs that are stressed or perhaps
invented as a consequence of standard patterns of e´lite thought. Some of these
193); Benoıˆt and Schwartz 1948, Cass. Dio 78.22–23, Hdn. 4.8.6–9.8, SHA M.Ant. 6.2–3 (a riot in
Alexandria in 215 and Caracalla’s massacre of the Alexandrians).
22 See Walter 1980 for an illuminating analysis of a bout of rioting in seventeenth-century England.
His discussion makes clear the gap between upper-class stereotypes regarding the causes of riots and
the actual social and economic conditions which produced the disorder, conditions which were far
more complex than a simple food shortage.
23 Stoops (1989: 81) has already used a similar approach in analyzing the riot of the silversmiths at
Ephesus reported at Acts 19.23–41, arguing that “a number of motifs recur with regularity in reports
of rioting connected with Jewish rights, and many of those motifs appear in Acts 19:23–41.”
24 Riots do appear in declamations and rhetorical handbooks: for example, Sen. Controv. 3.8;
ps.-Quint. Decl. maior. 11; Aelius Theon Progymnasmata 14 [ed. Patillon and Bolognesi]; Sopater
Scolia on the Staseis of Hermogenes 6.469 [ed. Walz]. It may well be the case that the sources’
often-repeated claim that a mob was fickle and irrational (cf. Yavetz 1969: 141–155) originated
from, or at least was perpetuated partly by, riot scenes in rhetorical works: Auct ad Her. 4.68: deinde
vaga multitudo . . . fugere coepit (“then the fickle mob . . . begins to flee”); cf. 4.67; Sen. Controv. 3.8:
mota semel multitudo modum non servat (“Once stirred up, a mob knows no boundaries”); ps.-Quint.
Decl. maior. 11.7: nihil est facilius quam in quemlibet adfectum movere populum; nulli, cum coimus, sua
156 PHOENIX
motifs might even reasonably be called literary topoi. One usually cannot tell
whether these standard features in the presentation of riots are a reflection of the
flavour of the sources used by an extant author, or a product of his redaction of his
source materials. Whatever the case, however, they do reflect the general ideals
and expectations of the e´lites of the empire.25
ii. when should the authorities respond to riots?
The first point that arises from reading reports about Roman riots with such a
focus is that our authors tend not to explain official responses to riots by reference
to a desire on the part of an emperor, governor or magistrate to preserve his own
threatened position or dignity, at least not explicitly.26 Rather, events tend to be
presented in such a way as to imply that there was a natural connection between
the riot and the authorities’ response, be it military or otherwise. The fact that the
authorities would seek to do something about a riot is, in other words, not seen
as a fact demanding special explanation. This is a striking pattern, especially since
it has been claimed that emperors and provincial governors tended to mobilize
troops against rioters only when their own authority, dignity and position were
threatened.27 Given the limited military resources at the authorities’ disposal, it
is possible that this is what happened in practice. The assumption of our sources
about what did and should happen is, however, rather different.
Of course, in some instances, the natural inference from the text is that the
preservation of position or dignity did motivate the person making the decision
to send troops against rioters or to respond in some other way to a riot. For
instance, the author of the Historia Augusta claims that troops were used to force
back the crowd which had been abusing, stoning, and obstructing Didius Julianus
immediately after his controversial accession in 193. Presumably, the reader is
meant to assume that the new emperor used the troops to do this because the
crowd’s actions threatened his dignity, legitimacy, and physical safety.28 But it
cogitatio, sua mens, ulla ratio praesto est, nec habet ulla turba prudentiam singulorum (“Nothing is easier
than arousing the people to whatever passion you like; when we assemble, no one possesses his own
judgment, his own mind, or any rationality, nor does any crowd have the good sense of individuals”).
There is no sign, however, of declamations involving riots whose factual matrix included acts of
military repression carried out by the authorities. This is perhaps unsurprising. The imagined city of
Greek declamation (see Russell 1983: 21–39) seems not to have had any military forces capable of
suppressing riots. When Latin declamations presuppose a Roman city, it is evidently a city without a
garrison. Consequently, no set narrative form for reporting riot repression emerged from rhetorical
works (see Stoops 1989: 81). There are, however, various declamations in which men are tried for
stirring up riots: Sen. Controv. 3.8; Sopater Scolia on the Staseis of Hermogenes 6.469 [ed. Walz].
25 See Erdkamp 2002: 107–110 for a similar use of the ancient sources to examine the “moral
economy” of the e´lites of the empire relating to food supplies.
26 Cf., however, Joseph. BJ 2.226.
27 Above, 151, n. 7.
28 SHA Did. Iul. 4.2–6. Cassius Dio’s account of the same incident (74.13.3–5), although differing
in some critical details, could also be interpreted to imply this. Similar reports of riots include: App.
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is often very difficult to infer such a personal motive from the facts presented.
For instance, Tacitus’ report of the official response to the amphitheatre riot at
Pompeii in 59 includes discussion of the delegation of the trial from the emperor
to the senate, and then to the consuls; the exile of the ringleaders; the dissolution
of illegal collegia; and the banning of similar meetings for ten years. There is
no hint that Nero, the senate, or the consuls acted to preserve their positions or
dignity. To take another example, Dio Chrysostom reports the military repression
of a riot in Alexandria by a certain “Conon.”29 The orator simply assumes that this
was a natural response for a Roman official confronted with a riotous situation,
and no explanation of his motives is offered. The same could be said of Plutarch’s
report of a riot between the inhabitants of Oxyrhynchus and Cynopolis over a
breach of religious taboos: the punitive response of the Romans is referred to with
no further need for explanation.30
In view of the general expectations that the e´lites of the empire had of the
Roman authorities regarding public order, it is unsurprising that the sources fre-
quently present the authorities’ response to a riot as an unremarkable consequence
of the violent disorder itself, rather than of the character of its causes. These
expectations are reflected in Velleius’ highly idealized catalogue of the blessings
of Tiberius’ reign: Tiberius, we are told, was responsible for the removal of seditio
from the Forum and from the theatre.31 Fronto likewise counts the checking of
seditio amongst the duties of the emperor.32 The obligation to combat large-scale
public disorders was assigned to lower magistrates as well: the Severan jurist
Ulpian claims that the duties of the urban prefect included “keeping the peace
among the citizens and maintaining order at public spectacles,” and that prefects
should post stationarii (i.e., soldiers with policing duties) at various locations
within the city to keep the peace and report to the prefect what is happening.33
The critical feature of these statements is that the duty of the imperial authorities
to suppress seditio is expressed as a general and unqualified one. It is interesting
to notice that a similar pattern of thought existed when it came to ideas about
B Civ. 5.67–68; Cass. Dio 48.31, 72.13.3–5, 78.22–23; Dio Chrys. 32.71–72; Epit. de Caes. 15.9;
Hdn. 1.12.3–9, 4.8.6–9.8, 7.4.2–6, 7.10.5; ps.-Sen. Oct. 780–855; SHA M.Ant. 6.2–3, Maximus et
Balbinus 9.1–4, Tyr. Trig. 22.1–6; Str. 17.819; and Tac. Ann. 1.77, 12.43, 14.61, 16.23.
29 See Jones 1997: 249 and literature cited there for the debate over whether the reading “Conon”
is a corruption in the manuscript tradition.
30 Plut. Mor. 380b–c. For other examples, see Caes. B Civ. 3.21; Tcherikover and Fuks 1957: no.
153; Cass. Dio 42.23.1–24.1, 54.6.2, 54.7.6, 54.10.1–5, 60.17.3, 69.8.1a; I.Eph. 2.215 = I.Magnesia
114; Joseph. AJ 19.278–285, BJ 2.490–498, 7.47–54; Sen. Clem. 1.15.1; Suet. Tib. 37, Claud. 25;
Tac. Ann. 13.48; Vett. Val. 5.10 p.231 [ed. Kroll].
31 Vell. Pat. 2.126.2: summota e foro seditio . . . compressa theatralis seditio . . . .
32 Fronto Ep. Vol. 2 p.58 [ed. Haines]: nam Caesarum est . . . seditiosos compescere.
33 Dig. 1.12.1.12 (Ulpian) [tr. Watson et al.]: quies quoque popularium et disciplina spectaculorum ad
praefecti urbi curam pertinere videtur: et sane debet etiam dispositos milites stationarios habere ad tuendam
popularium quietem et ad referendum sibi quid ubi agatur. Cf. Joseph. BJ 2.224 = AJ 20.106–107 for the
routine stationing of troops in Jerusalem during festivals to prevent disorders.
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the authorities’ duties in respect of another great public order problem in the
Roman empire: brigandage. An important element of imperial ideology was the
notion that Roman power guaranteed pax, a concept which denoted freedom
not just from war but also from violent crime (Yannakopulos 2003: 875–878).
As a consequence, it was commonly said that the princeps was responsible for
the elimination of piracy34 and land-based brigandage.35 It is often said that,
in reality, the limited resources at the disposal of the Roman authorities would
have meant that they acted to repress pirates and bandits only on rare occasions,
perhaps only when imperial interests were threatened or an influential person
made a complaint.36 Whatever the reality, the ideology was rather different. The
same was the case, it seems, with rioting.
The idea that the authorities did or should respond to riots in all circumstances
appears explicitly in two reports of specific riots. Suetonius reports that during
the reign of Tiberius the people of Pollentia impounded the body of a primipilaris
in their forum and refused to release it until the man’s heirs had agreed to fund a
gladiatorial contest. The emperor responded by having two cohorts descend on
Pollentia and by clapping the decurions and most of the populace into perpetua
vincula (Suet. Tib. 37.3). The incident is reported by Suetonius in a catalogue
of measures that Tiberius took for the public good (ad utilitates publicas) before
he supposedly turned autocratic (Suet. Tib. 33–37), so Suetonius’ assumption is
that the authorities (in this case the emperor) were not responding to the riot
out of self-interest. Specifically, Suetonius groups the incident with various other
claims about steps the emperor took to secure public order. These incidents
appear under a general rubric: “he especially took care to protect the peace from
highway robbery and brigandage and the disorderliness of seditions.”37 A list of
measures then follows. Apart from the resolution of the situation in Pollentia,
these include improved arrangements for security forces within Italy and Rome
(37.1); measures connected with theatre riots (37.2); the abolition of the right
of asylum throughout the empire (37.3); and the punishment of the Cyzicenes
for their mistreatment of Roman citizens (37.3). The actions taken against the
disorders at Pollentia are seen, therefore, as part of Tiberius’ general desire to
secure public order, and not as an attempt to avoid a threat to his own position or
dignity.
Also instructive is the story found in the Historia Augusta about the circum-
stances of Aemilianus’ supposed assumption of imperial power. The author says
that Aemilianus claimed the purple because a crowd, for some trivial reason,
34 Braund 1993; De Souza 1999: 195–197.
35 App. B Civ. 5.132; Arr. Epict. diss. 3.13.9–10; SHA Sev. 18.6; Suet. Aug. 32.1; Vell. Pat.
2.126.3; cf. Shaw 1984: 33–34, 43, 47.
36 Rostovtzeff 1905: 297; Millar 1981: 66–67; Hopwood 1983: 173, 182, n. 2; Braund 1993: 207;
Nippel 1995: 100, 103, 113.
37 Suet. Tib. 37.1: in primis tuendae pacis a grassaturis ac latrociniis seditionumque licentia curam
habuit.
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besieged his house, and he saw the assumption of imperial power as the only
means of self-preservation. The story is dubious and its internal logic opaque, but
it is interesting because it is prefaced by a general discussion of public order in
Alexandria. Repeating the topos of the frivolity and turbulence of the Alexandrian
crowd, the author alleges that riots break out as a consequence of “slaves’ boots”
and other such trivialities. The resulting disorders, he claims, often are of a scale
that threatens the res publica and “accordingly troops have been armed against
them.”38 The author’s assumption is, therefore, that even riots whose causes are
trivial can constitute a threat to the res publica. The purpose of the military forces
in Alexandria is to suppress such riots and thereby avoid such threats—even when
the riots spring from causes which are apolitical and are not connected with the
personal standing or dignity of Roman officials, causes such as slaves’ boots.
It was not just members of the western e´lite who believed that riots of all types
ought to (and frequently did) lead to a response from the Roman authorities. As
mentioned already, Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom are found reporting repressive
measures as if they were simply the natural result of a riot.39 Greek authors of
the principate are also found ascribing a general concern for riot control to the
republican authorities. Appian presents the senate as believing that the riotous
situation in Rome in 52 b.c. needed some sort of remedy (yerape’a), and hence
looking to Pompey (B Civ. 2.23). Plutarch, in discussing the same incident,
imagines Cato begrudgingly coming to the view that Pompey should be called
upon to act as sole consul as a result of the need to choose a moderate remedy
(æama) for the evil (t˜ kak—n) of public disorder (Cat. Min. 47.2). Elsewhere,
he describes the incident as Cato calling on Pompey to take charge of promoting
public order (Pomp. 54.3).
Moreover, Jewish writers assume that Roman governors were under a positive
obligation to intervene in riots, an assumption that is not surprising in view of
how frequently the Jewish inhabitants of the empire were the target of rioting.
Such an assumption runs throughout Philo’s In Flaccum. In accordance with one
of the conventions of ancient biography, Philo assigns to Flaccus a good period at
the start of his prefecture. During this period, Philo claims, Flaccus’ statesmanlike
deeds included the establishment of good order (e[nom’a) throughout the city
and the countryside by measures such as the repression of clubs (°taire’ai) and
societies (sun—doi, 4–5), and the expulsion of Isidorus, who was the author of
much of the disorder in the city (135–145). In the later stages of his prefecture,
Flaccus failed in his duty to maintain public order, in Philo’s view. Philo alleges
that Flaccus was approached by members of the Greek community of the city with
a proposal that he should “surrender and give up the Jews,”40 thereby winning
38 SHA Tyr.Trig. 22.2: saepe illi [sc. populi Aegyptiorum] ob neglectas salutationes, locum in balneis
non concessum, carnem et olera sequestrata, calceamenta servilia et cetera talia usque ad summum rei publicae
periculum in seditiones, ita ut armarentur contra eas exercitus, pervenerunt.
39 See above, 157.
40 §23: . . . me”zon d' úgay˜n o[dn a[t_ parjeiw É tow &Iouda’ouw \kdow ka“ promenow.
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the support of the Greek community, which would intercede on his behalf with
the emperor Gaius. Flaccus assented to this proposal, even though, says Philo
“it was his duty to repulse and scorn the speakers as revolutionaries and common
enemies.”41 As a consequence of this assent, Flaccus was supposedly complicit in
the insults directed by rowdy crowds at the visiting King Agrippa, even though,
in Philo’s view, he ought to have arrested and punished those who insulted the
king, especially given that an unruly mob will not stop with just one crime (30–35,
40–41). Next, he is said to have been complicit in the erection of images in
synagogues (41–42). Finally, he permitted the Greeks to riot against the Jews of
the city, which Josephus condemns as a “profession of tyranny” on Flaccus’ part.42
Josephus also assumes that governors have a duty to respond to riots. This
expectation is clear in his report of the events which resulted from the lynching
of some Galilaean pilgrims in the Samaritan village of Ginae (or Gema).43 In the
Antiquities, Josephus claims that the procurator of Judaea, Ventidius Cumanus,
was bribed by the Samaritans and therefore “neglected to avenge” (t|n \kd’khsin
½ligQrhsen) the murdered Galilaeans, a statement that probably contains an
implicit condemnation of the procurator (AJ 20.119).44 Josephus then says that the
Galilaeans incited the Jewish masses to take up arms, urging them to protect their
liberty (\leuyer’a) and representing Cumanus’ behaviour as an insult (¹briw) to
the Galilaean community (AJ 20.120). Again, then, we find the belief that a
governor should respond in some way to a riot.45
iii. how should the authorities respond to riots?
Saying that there was often an expectation amongst the e´lites of the empire that
the Roman (and sometimes the local) authorities would respond to a riot raises
the question of precisely what the authorities were expected to do in response to a
particular riot. On this question, the sources reveal a nuanced set of expectations,
which again were not entirely consistent with each other. One principle, however,
appears fairly consistently in the sources: that an emperor, governor, or magistrate
confronted with a riot ought, if possible, to avoid the use of force to quell it, and
not take drastic punitive measures in the wake of the riot.46 In a sense, this is
an application to riots of the principle enunciated by Seneca: that it is the duty
of a princeps to resort to punishment only when all other remedies (remedia) have
41 §24: \pi toœtoiw ¥fe’lvn úpQsasyai ka“ dusxer‰nai tow lgontaw qw nevteropoiow ka“
koinow polem’ouw sunepigr‡fetai to”w lexye”si.
42 §54: oû t“ ©n eæh turann’dow \p‡ggelma me’zon; On the structure of the complex argument in
§54, see Box 1939: 99.
43 Joseph. AJ 20.118–136, BJ 2.232–246; cf. Tac. Ann. 12.54.
44 The parallel passage in the BJ (2.233) simply has Cumanus treating the Galilaean petition as
less important than other matters with which he had to deal.
45 See too Joseph. BJ 2.296 for another statement about the obligation of a procurator (Gessius
Florus) to quell inter-ethnic rioting.
46 Cf., however, Griffin 1991: 40, suggesting that emperors in practice did not hesitate to use force
against rioters.
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been exhausted (Clem. 1.14.1). Libanius enunciates explicitly how this principle
should be applied to rioting: rioters are out of their minds; therefore, just as one
should pity and try to correct the insane with medicine, so too with rioting cities
(Or. 19.8–11). He still assumes that an emperor should do something about a
riot, but rejects the appropriateness of punishment (Or. 19.24), and stresses that
the emperor’s response should display clemency (=mer—thw; Or. 19.18–19, cf.
11–13).
For many of the authors who discuss riots, the favoured remedium seems to
have been for a great man to use his personal standing in the eyes of the crowd to
convince it, either in person or by an edict or letter,47 to desist from its destructive
behaviour. This preference is seen in a number of obiter dicta in reports about
riots. The Epitome de Caesaribus contains a report about Antoninus Pius being
stoned by a crowd during a grain shortage (15.9). The epitomator (or his source)
uses the incident to show that the emperor was merciful (mitis): he chose to
placate the seditio with plain reasoning rather than to exact retribution. The
emperor’s behaviour is thus praised as being in conformity with the often-stressed
imperial values of mercy and moderation.48 For practical reasons as well it was
sometimes seen as preferable for an emperor or governor to try to quell the riot
by making a personal appeal. Cassius Dio, when reporting that Hadrian calmed
stasis in Alexandria with a letter, comments that the incident demonstrates how
the emperor’s word is mightier than the sword.49 Practical considerations also
apparently prompted the governor of Asia to reprimand the rioting bakers of
Ephesus in an edict (which is preserved in an inscription): the governor stresses
that the instigators deserved to be arrested and put on trial, but that he had
opted for an edict reprimanding and threatening them, since the welfare of the
city was more important than the punishment of the offenders.50 The practical
justification and that based on the ideology of mercy and moderation could also
coexist: Cassius Dio’s report of Caesar’s quelling of the rioting of 47 b.c. also
assumes that his unexpected personal appearance before the rioters succeeded
where Antony’s military measures had failed. At the same time, he stresses that
Caesar’s refusal to do anything more heavy-handed was an instance of his habitual
clemency (42.33.1–3).
This ideological preference for leaders to use personal standing makes it
unsurprising that many reports of riots contain accounts of personal appeals to
a crowd on the part of political leaders and other members of the e´lite.51 There
47 Edicts, of course, would often be read before the people (cf. Tcherikover and Fuks 1957: no.
153, col. I), so they too involved the same element of oral performance as a personal appearance.
48 For moderation as a virtue appropriate to an emperor, see Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 41–42 and
references there. On the appropriateness of these virtues for a provincial governor, see Apul. Flor. 9,
17.
49 Cass. Dio 69.8.1a: o¹tv pou plon  sxœsei a[tokr‡torow l—gow t™n Ðplvn. Cf. SHA Hadr.
12.1.
50 I.Eph. 2.215 = I.Magnesia 114. See Buckler 1923: 30–33 for translation and commentary.
51 Acts 19.23–41; App. B Civ. 5.68; Cass. Dio 42.33.2, 48.31.6, 54.1.4, cf. 54.10.5; Dio Chrys. 46,
32.72; Epit. de Caes. 15.9; Joseph. BJ 2.11–13, 2.490–498, 2.595–613; Lucian Alex. 45, Demon. 64;
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are also several instances in which emperors or magistrates are said to have used
edicts or letters to try to check rioting.52 The scene of the man of great personal
standing calming the crowd was something of a literary topos. It is used by
poets, most famously by Vergil in an extended metaphor;53 it appears in the early
books of Livy in stories that must be largely fictitious;54 and it is even found
in the rather more demotic apocryphal acts of the apostles, with apostles in the
process of being martyred dissuading sympathetic crowds from killing the leader
of the persecution.55 This raises the suspicion that this topos is simply being
reproduced in some of the supposedly historical reports of riots; for instance, the
various passages in which Philostratus reports that Apollonius of Tyana quelled a
riot through personal charisma are prime candidates for such suspicion (Philostr.
V A 1.15, 1.16, 5.26). But comparative evidence should perhaps restrain the
assumption that this can never have been an effective means of quelling disputes:
one historian of nineteenth-century Britain has even suggested that riots were
more effectively quelled by magistrates pleading with rioters than by the use of
troops (Stevenson 1977: 44).
This said, the evidence regarding the use of personal appeals to quell riots is, it
seems, distorted in at least one way: leaders whom the sources (or the traditions
behind them) regard as immoral, cruel, or despised tend not to be portrayed
as successfully employing this device. One only finds stories of the successful
use of personal appeals relating to leaders who are regarded with approval or
indifference, a pattern which also applies to fictional accounts which include
this topos.56 Granted, there are various instances of leaders of whom the author
approves (or to whom he is indifferent) unsuccessfully using this approach.57 But
the inverse does not occur: there are no cases of leaders regarded by the sources as
Philostr. V A 1.15, 1.16, 5.26, V S 1.23; SHA Did. Iul. 4.4, Maximus et Balbinus 9.2–4; cf. Sen. Clem.
1.15.1 and Joseph. BJ 7.47–54 for less secure examples. Closely analogous are reports of attempts
to quell mutinies through personal, charismatic appeals to the mutineers: Suet. Iul. 33; Tac. Ann.
1.18–19, 24–30, 34–44, Hist. 3.10, cf. 3.20–21.
52 Tcherikover and Fuks 1957: nos. 153, 435; Cass. Dio 69.8.1a; Hdn. 7.12.2–3; I.Eph. 2.215
= I.Magnesia 114; Joseph. AJ 19.278–285; Tac. Ann. 14.45.2, cf. 11.13. Claudius’ letter to the
Alexandrians expressly rejects the option of holding a judicial inquiry into who was responsible for the
rioting in Alexandria, and instead confines itself to reproaches and threats for the future: CPJ 153,
lines 76–77.
53 Verg. Aen. 1.148–153; cf. Perseus 4.6–8.
54 Livy 2.32.8–12, 5.25.2–3; cf. RE “Menenius” 12 for references to later mentions of the story of
Menenius at Livy 2.32.8–12.
55 Passion of Andrew 7 [ed. Lipsius and Bonnet, II, 1, 16–18]; Martyrium Petri et Pauli 61–2 [ed.
Lipsius, I, 170–172]; Acta Philippi 24 [eds. Lipsius and Bonnet, II, 2, 13].
56 Successful personal appearances are reported in: Acts 19.23–41; Epit. de Caes. 15.9; Lucian Alex.
45, Demon. 64; Philostr. V A 1.15, V S 1.23. A successful use of an edict is reported by Cass. Dio
69.8.1a. All the fictional instances of the successful use of personal authority involve leaders of whom
the sources approve: see above, 162, nn. 53–55 for references.
57 Dio Chrys. 32.72 (“Conon”); Herodian 7.12.2–3 (Balbinus); Joseph. BJ 2.8–9 (a strategos of
Herod Archelaus), 2.267 (the elders of the Caesarean Jews), 2.493 (the leaders of the Alexandrian
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immoral, cruel, or despised being successful in this way. They always fail.58 Since
it is unlikely that rioting crowds’ judgments of leaders coincided precisely with
those of our extant sources, one suspects that any stories of supposedly “bad” rulers
stopping riots in this way dropped out of the tradition. This is unsurprising, given
that both fictional and historical reports of the successful use of such personal
authority over a crowd often stress the leader’s moral worth (and sometimes his
sanctity).59
The sources also contain accounts of attempts to control or punish rioters by the
use of methods other than personal appeals. Mostly these methods involved the
use of troops against crowds, although there are a few mentions of other types of
official response.60 When it came to the use of troops against crowds, assessments
of the moral worth of the emperor, governor, or magistrate commanding the
troops again were relevant. There are various reports of emperors using soldiers
to massacre crowds that were guilty only of verbal protests or insults, often
uttered at a public spectacle. Every one of these incidents concerns a leader of
whom the particular writer or the tradition in general disapproved: the emperors
Gaius, Nero, Vitellius, Domitian, Commodus, Didius Iulianus, and Caracalla;
Commodus’ cubicularius Cleander;61 and the procurators of Judaea, Pontius Pilate
and Gessius Florus. The incidents tend to be mentioned in catalogues of these
leaders’ alleged murderousness, saevitia (“cruelty”) or violentia (“violence”).62 On
Jews); SHA Maximus et Balbinus 9.2–4 (Balbinus). Seneca (Brev. Vit. 18.5) also expresses the general
view that a hungry crowd listens neither to reasoning nor to pleas.
58 SHA Did. Iul. 4.4 (Didius Iulianus); Tac. Ann. 14.45.2 (Nero).
59 Epit. de Caes. 15.9: usque eo . . . mitis fuit, ut . . . (“he was so gentle that”); Verg. Aen. 1.151: tum,
pietate gravem ac meritis . . . virum quem conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus astant . . . (“then they have
caught sight of some man having authority by reason of piety and service, they are silent and they stand
by with ears pricked up”); Livy 5.25.3: ab horum aetatibus dignitatibusque et honoribus violandis dum
abstinebatur (“While they desisted from outraging their age, worthiness, and official positions”); Livy
2.32.8–12 with 2.33.10–11. That the authors of the apocryphal acts of the apostles saw the apostles
who quelled riots as men of great sanctity needs no proof, and the same applies to Philostratus and
Apollonius.
60 These types of response include: the granting of concessions to the rioters (Joseph. BJ 2.169–174
= AJ 18.55–59, BJ 2.184–203 = AJ 18.261–288, BJ 2.228–231 = AJ 20.113–117); the arrest, trial
and/or punishment of some of the rioters (Joseph. BJ 2.269 = AJ 20.174; CPJ 158a and b, 435; P
Oxy. 22.2339; Vett. Val. 5.10 p. 231 [ed. Kroll]; cf. TAM 4.1.3); the removal of a city’s privileges as
a free city (Cass. Dio 54.7.6, 60.17.3, Suet. Claud. 25.3); a ban on certain collegia in the offending
community (I.Eph. 2.215 = I.Magnesia 114; Tac. Ann. 14.17); and a ban on certain types of public
spectacles in the community (Tac. Ann. 14.17). References to such attempts to punish rioters or
control future riots are too few to discern e´lite attitudes to these types of responses to riots.
61 PIR 1 C 883 = PIR 2 A 1481 = Weaver 2004: no. 1886.
62 Gaius: Cass. Dio 59.28.11, Joseph. AJ 19.24–26, Suet. Calig. 26.4: superbia violentiaque
(“arrogance and violence”); Nero: Tac. Ann. 16.5; Vitellius: Suet. Vit. 14.3, cf. 13.1: saevitia
(“cruelty”); Domitian: Suet. Dom. 10.1: saevitia; Commodus: SHA Comm. 15.6; Didius Iulianus:
Cass. Dio 74.13.3–5 (but cf. SHA Did. Iul. 4.2–4.10); Caracalla: Cass. Dio 78.22–23, Hdn. 4.6.4–5:
m}pote gen—menon Árgon (“an unprecedented act”), 4.8.6–9.8, SHA M. Ant. 6.2–3 (but cf. Benoıˆt and
Schwartz 1948); Cleander: Hdn. 1.12.6; Pontius Pilate: Joseph. BJ 2.175–177 = AJ 18.60–62; Gessius
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the other hand, when rulers viewed with approval are presented as using troops
against a crowd, the crowd tends to be depicted as having used actual violence
first.63 So it seems that for the authors of our sources and those who transmitted
the traditions that stand behind these sources, it was not unthinkable for a “good”
ruler to use military force against a crowd, so long as the crowd was actually
behaving in a violent fashion. This principle is neatly illustrated by an anecdote
in Libanius relating to Constantine: the emperor, Libanius claims, was the target
of licentious shouts from the Roman people. On asking his two brothers how to
respond, he was advised by one to massacre the crowd and by the other to ignore
the behaviour as was “appropriate to a ruler” (basilik—w). Constantine supposedly
responded to this advice by declaring that the latter approach was the proper one,
and that rulers should tolerate such unruliness.64 Whether the anecdote is true or
not, it highlights how military intervention was considered inappropriate against
a crowd guilty only of verbal insults.
Further, in situations of military repression, there seems to have sometimes
been an expectation that the force used to repress the crowd be moderate. This
belief is given dramatic expression in the Octavia attributed to Seneca. A prefect
(presumably a praetorian prefect) reports to Nero that the ringleaders of the
violent crowd that had threatened the palace have been killed, thus stopping the
riot. Nero is outraged at this, and believes that the entire crowd ought to have been
massacred, a position which the prefect treats as improper and the consequence of
dolor (“vexations,” ps.-Sen. Oct. 846–855). A similar disapproval of immoderate
acts of repression underpins Eutropius’ report of the riot of the minters in Rome
under Aurelian: the minters are portrayed as having started the riot and having
committed murder before the military repression began. Nevertheless, Aurelian
is said to have repressed the riot with utmost cruelty (ultima crudelitate),65 which
implies that there were limits that a leader should observe even when dealing with
rioters guilty of violence.
Florus: Joseph. BJ 2.297–308: t˜ kain˜n tw ^Rvma’vn ½m—thtow (“the novelty of the Romans’
savagery”), 2.318–329. See too Gaius’ murderous intentions towards the Roman people, provoked by
cheers: Suet. Calig. 30.
63 It is possible that Pompey’s use of troops at the trials of Milo and Scaurus in 52 b.c. was
against crowds which were guilty only of verbal unruliness. The language used to describe their
behaviour is, however, ambiguous: Cass. Dio 40.53.3: yorubhs‡ntvn . . . tin™n (“certain people
making a disturbance”); App. B Civ. 2.24: to dmou tow kathg—rouw \noxlontow (“the crowd
having troubled the prosecutors”). In any case, given the behaviour of the pro-Clodian crowds
earlier in the year, it may be that Dio and Appian saw Pompey as responding at least to a threat of
violence.
64 Lib. Or. 19.19: . . . tow d kratontaw prpein únxesyai t™n toioœtvn skirthm‡tvn . . .;
cf. Or. 20.24.
65 Eutrop. 9.14. Other reports of the same incident also comment on the cruelty of Aurelian’s
repression, although they do not state explicitly that the minters had been the first to employ violence:
Epit. de Caes. 35.4: . . . quos Aurelianus victos ultima crudelitate compescuit (“whom Aurelian repressed
with utmost cruelty when they were defeated”); SHA Aurel. 38.2: quod acerrime severissimeque compescuit
(“he repressed it severely and harshly”).
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This belief that troops should only be used against violent crowds, and then
only in moderation, does not, however, run through all the reports of riots in
which military repression occurred. Texts which focus strongly on the impropriety
of the crowd’s violent actions tend to offer no opinion as to whether the military
action was moderate or excessive, and usually offer no details about it which
might invite such a judgment.66 At times we are not even told whether the crowd
behaved violently in the first place, so as to provoke such a military response (Tac.
Ann. 1.77). This is illustrated by Cicero’s response in 44 b.c. to the repression
of Amatius, the “false Marius.” Appian claims that Amatius threatened violence
against Brutus and Cassius, and that his supporters actually rioted (B Civ. 3.2–3).
But Cicero does not concern himself with the details of the behaviour of Amatius
or his supporters, or whether the repressive actions of M. Antonius and Dolabella
were appropriate. Instead, he praises the consuls (especially Dolabella) fulsomely,
and heaps abuse on Amatius and his followers.67 This disregard for the details
of the situation was apparently not universal: Appian claims that the senate was
torn between shock at the illegality of Amatius’ execution and the expediency
of being rid of him (B Civ. 3.3). Cicero also hints at disapproval of Dolabella’s
actions on the part of certain people (Att. 14.15 [= SB 369].2), whose numbers
included Pansa (Att. 14.19 [= SB 372].2) and possibly Atticus,68 although he does
not make the substance of these objections clear. Given his disdain for the mob,
Tacitus also tends to ignore details about the nature of the repressive action and
the prior behaviour of the crowd, although he is by no means alone in this.69
In other words, the principle of moderation in repression was one that could be
selectively invoked, depending on whether the author (or his sources) wished to
make a judgment on the authority behind the repressive action or on the propriety
of the crowd’s behaviour.
Various writers from the east of the empire give a slightly different nuance
to their reports of the use of troops against crowds by “good” rulers: even when
the crowd has behaved violently from the start, the use of troops is presented as
the last resort, employed only after other techniques of riot control have failed.
In such cases, the final military action might be presented as quite drastic and
unrestrained, but it is implicitly justified as being the last resort. In his account
of “Conon”70 confronting a rioting Alexandrian crowd, Dio Chrysostom claims
that he at first attempted to avoid engaging the crowd with the soldiers whom he
had under his command and simply spoke to it. Only when the crowd engaged
66 Cass. Dio 54.6.6; Tac. Ann. 3.14 (cf. Eck 1996: 250–251), 12.43, 13.48, 14.61; Suet. Tib. 37.
67 Cic. Att. 14.8.1 [= Shackleton Bailey ed. (SB), 362.1], 14.15 [= SB 369].1–2, 14.16 [= SB
370].2, 14.17a [= SB 371a], 14.19 [= SB 372], Fam. 9.14 [= SB 326], 12.1 [= SB 327.1], Phil. 1.5,
1.30, 2.107.
68 Cic. Att. 14.15 [= SB 369].2: nunc prorsus adsentio tuis litteris speroque meliora (“Now I absolutely
agree with your letter and hope for better circumstances”); cf. 14.16 [= SB 370].2, 14.19 [= SB 372].1.
69 Tac. Ann. 1.77, 3.14 (cf. Eck 1996: 250–251), 12.43, 14.61, Hist. 4.3; cf. Cass. Dio 54.6.5.
70 Cf. above, 157, n. 29.
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with the soldiers did he unleash the full fury of military repression against the
rioters.71
A similar gradated response to rioting is found in Josephus. For example, he
claims that, during the disorders that broke out in 4 b.c. at the death of Herod
the Great, in what was then the client kingdom of Judaea, Archelaus began by
wishing to use persuasion rather than force by sending a general (strathg—w)
to reason with the threatening crowd. When the crowd stoned the general,
Archelaus then supposedly sent a cohort to seize or restrain by force (b’Ù . . .
katasxe”n) only the ringleaders of the riot. When this failed, so Josephus claims,
Archelaus formed the view that it was now impossible to restrain the crowd
without killing members of it and so initiated a large-scale military action against
it.72 Josephus attributes a similar approach to a Roman official as well. During
a riot between Jews and Greeks in Alexandria, the prefect Ti. Julius Alexander
(who was himself of Jewish origin) began by sending a delegation of well-known
men to the Jews in an attempt to convince them to desist without recourse to
arms. Josephus—interestingly sympathizing with the prefect rather than with
the Jewish community—claims that it was only when this failed that Alexander
understood that only a great misfortune would restrain the Jews’ rebelliousness,
and sent troops to kill Jewish rioters and plunder their property.73 This attempt
to quell the riot by having well-known (and presumably Jewish) members of the
community make personal appeals is partially paralleled in various other reports
about riots from the east of the empire, in which a local magistrate or prominent
local figure is found pleading with the rioters to desist before they provoke
Roman intervention.74 Whether these details are fictitious or reflections of actual
behaviour, they in any case indicate a preference on the part of the e´lites of the
East to be allowed to deal with public order problems in their own communities
71 Dio Chrys. 32.71–73. Jones (1997: 253) has tentatively suggested that Dio Chrysostom here
refers to two incidents: a minor riot (tarax}) put down by “Conon,” and then a later major riot or
rebellion (p—lemow), which he would connect with the disorders prompted by the arrival of Jewish
Sicarii in Alexandria (cf. Joseph. BJ 7.407–419; Lib. Or. 20.30–32; Jer. Chron. p. 188 [ed. Helm]). It
is, however, more natural to read the passage as referring to a single event which escalated from a minor
riot into a major one. In §73 Dio argues that he is justified in mentioning these events, since recalling
them will help the Alexandrians understand the outcomes (tˆ fu—mena) of their disorderliness. If the
incident in §72 to which Conon responded is read as separate from the p—lemow, then the justificatory
argument in §73 breaks down, since the disorder to which Conon responded would seem to have had
no consequences, beyond some taunting from Conon.
72 Joseph. AJ 17.206–218 = BJ 2.4–13. BJ 2.12: . . . o[ m|n &Arxel‡~ d’xa f—nou kayekt˜n Áti
t˜ plyow \fa’neto . . . (“It appeared to Archelaus that the crowd could not be restrained without
bloodshed . . .”).
73 Joseph. BJ 2.490–498: Kúke”now [sc. Tibriow] sunidWn qw xvr“w meg‡lhw sumfor‰w o[k ©n
paœsainto nevter’zontew . . . . For a similar case, see BJ 2.270 = AJ 20.177. In AJ 20.105–112 (cf.
BJ 2.224–227) the procurator Cumanus attempts to quell a verbal protest with personal persuasion
before bringing in his entire army, the sight of which causes a lethal stampede.
74 Acts 19.23–41; Dio Chrys. 46.14; Joseph. BJ 2.267, 2.316, 2.320–325; cf. Joseph. BJ 2.237, AJ
17.212, 20.121.
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without Roman involvement.75 This preference receives its clearest expression in
Aelius Aristides’ Roman Oration. Rome, claims Aristides, has managed to retain
its empire not through the imposition of garrisons, but through the extension of
citizenship to local e´lites, which means that “there is no need for garrisons to
hold their citadels, but the men of greatest standing and influence in every city
guard their own fatherlands for you [i.e., the Romans]” (Or. 26.64). Elsewhere
in the oration Aristides claims that there are no garrisons in the cities,76 a fact
which distinguishes the Roman empire from that of Athens (which garrisoned
subject cities to the detriment of its hegemony; 26.52). Of course, as an account
of how order was maintained in the empire, this is at best distorted and at worst
pure fantasy: Roman forces were used to maintain order in cities on occasion, and
several major cities were garrisoned, including Aristides’ own city of Alexandria.
The fact that Aristides would offer such a disingenuous picture shows how strong
the preference in the East was for local e´lites to take care of order in their own
cities. Accounts of riots from eastern sources often conform with this view. They
tend to believe that Romans will intervene if the attempts of local authorities to
quell a riot fail. They are therefore still assuming that the imperial authorities are
interested in seeing riots quelled and rioters punished, but they expect that the
imperial authorities will provide an opportunity for local e´lites to do this first.77
iv. what happened when attempts to repress riots
militarily were made?
A number of reports about the repression of riots through the use of military
force contain claims about what happened when the soldiers engaged with the
crowd. It has been suggested that military responses to riots in Rome were swift
and decisive: a complaint would be made to the authorities; soldiers would be
dispatched; and order would be restored.78 Generally, it has been said, the mere
75 Libanius (Or. 19.31–5) even felt the need to justify to Theodosius why the magistrates of
Antioch in 387 did not intervene when rioters destroyed images of the emperor, which suggests that
he assumed that the imperial authorities expected such intervention of local political e´lites. For the
role of local e´lites in the East in keeping order, see Plut. Mor. 814e–816a and Yannakopulos 2003:
881–883. Erdkamp (2002: 106) also notes that reports of food riots written by eastern authors
portray the crowd as looking toward the local e´lite rather than the imperial authorities for solutions to
shortages of food.
76 Aristid. Or. 26.29, 67a; cf. Behr 1981: 87, 376, n. 73 for the meaning of the latter passage.
77 Of course Josephus is not entirely consistent on this point: as seen above (160) he expects swift
Roman intervention when an anti-Jewish riot was in progress, but when a Jewish crowd was rioting,
he seems to have favoured a gradated response by the Roman authorities, with an opportunity for
Jewish leaders to calm the situation being given first.
78 Yavetz 1969: vii, 10, 12; Yavetz 1986: 173; Griffin 1991: 40; Vanderbroek 1987: 159. For
more general assertions about the effectiveness of troops in checking disorder, see Africa 1971: 8,
19; MacMullen 1966: 164; Oost 1961: 2. Nippel (1995: 98) also asserts that there was a dramatic
improvement in the government’s capacity to quell riots with the coming of the principate, but stresses
the importance in the equation of the presence or absence of the political will to use troops.
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threat of military repression was enough to control riots.79 A pair of parallel
passages in Josephus report that an unruly crowd fled at the mere sight of a large
military force, the crowd’s panic being so great that a lethal stampede ensued (BJ
2.226–227 = AJ 20.111.112). One passage in Tacitus would appear to suggest
that the sight of soldiers was enough to repress disorder in various Campanian
towns in 69 (Hist. 4.3). A passage in Herodian seems to support this as a general
proposition: Herodian has Maximinus Thrax claim that the bravery of the Roman
crowd extends only to shouting and that they need only see a soldier to flee in
panic, trampling each other (7.8.6). One doubts, however, whether Herodian
meant this to be taken seriously rather than as an example of Maximinus’ deluded
bravado. In fact, soon afterwards Herodian claims that, on the appointment
of Maximus, a crowd in Rome took a strong stand against the new emperor,
stopping him from leaving the Capitol, and even resisting an armed bodyguard of
veterans and equestrian youth. Only the appointment by the senate of Gordian iii
as emperor calmed the people (7.10.7). This passage may even be designed to
undermine Maximinus’ claims about the behaviour of the crowd in the face of
armed military opposition, and so show how dogged loyalty (in this case to the
Gordiani) could prompt resistance to military repression on the part of a crowd.
There are various other instances in which crowds are said to have defied soldiers.
For instance, Asconius claims that the Clodians who surrounded the court in
which Milo was tried were not restrained by fear of Pompey’s encircling soldiers.80
Cassius Dio claims that on the same occasion the Clodian crowd responded with
jeers to the soldiers’ attempt to drive it from the Forum, its members behaving as
if they were being struck in some sort of game (40.53.3). He also says that when
Dolabella stirred up a riot in 47 b.c., the more rioters M. Antonius slaughtered,
the more disorderly the survivors became (42.33.1).
Further, at times crowds are presented as being not only defiant, but also
somewhat successful in their defiance. It is true that some reports of military
repression present the soldiers’ actions as fairly swift and clinical. Interestingly,
these incidents mostly are said to have occurred in relatively open, flat areas of
cities, such as the fora and the areas outside imperial residences.81 Accounts of
79 Griffin 1991: 40.
80 Asc. 41–42 C: qui [sc. Clodiani] se continere ne metu quidem circumstantium militum potuerunt
(“[the supporters of Clodius] . . . who were not able to restrain themselves even with the fear of the
surrounding soldiers”).
81 App. B Civ. 2.24 (Roman Forum); Cass. Dio 40.53.3 (Roman Forum); Suet. Tib. 37 (Forum
of Pollentia); Tac. Ann. 12.43 (Roman Forum); Hdn. 1.12.6–8 (cf. 1.12.5: \n proaste’~ Kom—dou,
“in Commodus’ suburban villa”; Cass. Dio 72.13.4 with Andermahr 1998: 408–409); SHA Did. Iul.
4.2–6 (Roman Forum, cf. Cass. Dio 74.13.4); Hdn. 7.12.4 (in front of the castra Praetoriana). There
are various riots whose details are less clear, but which might be examples of the same assumption.
If Eck (1996: 250–251) is right to read Tac. Ann. 3.14 as implying the use of troops by Tiberius,
then this is an instance of an account of successful riot repression on the scalae Gemoniae and the
north-western end of the Forum. The successful use of troops by Nero to restrain crowds wishing to
free the condemned slaves of L. Pedanius Secundus in 62 (Tac. Ann. 14.45) may have taken place in
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riots in which the rioters are said to have been in or on top of buildings, or in
narrow streets, portray rather more successful resistance to military repression.82
In his account of a crowd’s attack on Octavian and M. Antonius in 38 b.c., Appian
seems to imply that Antonius and his troops had difficulty physically extracting
Octavian from the situation. The attack took place just off the Forum, in a
cramped area of the Via Sacra surrounded by houses.83 Accounts of theatre riots
in the first century a.d. also assume that soldiers met with difficulties in keeping
order. Tacitus reports that soldiers stationed at the theatre in Rome were killed
trying to stop a theatre riot in a.d. 15.84 A number of sources claim that even
after this event rioting continued to break out in the theatre under Tiberius.85
There are also various lurid stories about Nero watching (and even participating
in) theatre riots, in spite of the presence of soldiers.86 Cassius Dio assumes that
the riots were made worse when Nero deliberately removed the soldiers from the
theatre, and Tacitus assumes that the reintroduction of the soldiers was in some
way part of the cure for this escalation of theatre violence (Cass. Dio 61.8.3; Tac.
Ann. 13.25). A military presence at the theatre is not considered to have been
totally useless, therefore; by the same token, the sources assume that a certain
amount of rioting occurred in spite of it.
Other accounts of riots during both the first and the third centuries describe
pitched battles between the people and soldiers. Reports of the Flavian capture of
Rome in 69 portray the supporters of Vitellius, many of whom were apparently
civilians (Tac. Hist. 3.80), inflicting considerable casualties on soldiers by pelting
them from the tops of houses with roof tiles, javelins, and stones (Tac. Hist. 3.82;
Cass. Dio 64.19.3). Herodian reports riots in both 190 and 238 in which crowds
allegedly resisted troops by throwing roof tiles, stones, and pots at them from the
roofs of houses.87 Herodian asserts that in 190 the battle stopped only when the
people were granted their wish: the head of Cleander. In 238, he claims, the
soldiers were forced to set fire to the houses which the crowd was using, thereby
the broad, open thoroughfares of the Argiletum and clivus suburanus. These roads were the logical
route between the Mamertine Prison, in which the slaves would have been held, and the Campus
Esquilinus, the usual place of execution for slaves: see Hengel 1977: 54; Hinard 1987: 113.
82 Cf. Caes. B Civ. 3.106–107 for the claim that rioters inflicted losses on Roman soldiers, without
any specific information about where in Alexandria this occurred.
83 App. B Civ. 5.68: ` &AntQniow m—liw . . . parly . . . (“Antonius only just got in . . .”).
84 Tac. Ann 1.77; cf. Cass. Dio 57.14.4.
85 Theatre riots under Tiberius: Cass. Dio 57.14.4; Suet. Tib. 37; Cass. Dio 57.21.3. The continued
presence of soldiers at the theatre under Tiberius is suggested by the fact that during the reign of Nero
there were soldiers stationed at the theatre (Cass. Dio 61.8.3; Tac. Ann. 13.25), and that Dio treats
this as a long-standing practice.
86 Cass. Dio 61.8.2–3; Suet. Ner. 26; Tac. Ann. 13.25. This cannot be ascribed to a real or imagined
unwillingness on the part of the soldiers to deprive the emperor of his raucous pleasures, since Dio
and Tacitus both emphasize that at times Nero watched and participated in the riots secretly.
87 Hdn. 1.12.8–9, 7.12.5–7. Cassius Dio’s rather different version of the riot of 190 (72.13) also
records the crowd’s resistance to troops sent by Cleander, without giving any details.
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compelling the rioters to come to terms. The accounts in the Historia Augusta of
the events of 238 contain similar details.88 One suspects that a similar incident
lies behind the laconic report in the epitome of Book 80 of Cassius Dio that,
during the lifetime of the jurist Ulpian,89 a great quarrel arose between the people
and the praetorians, which led to a three-day battle with heavy losses on both
sides. The praetorians, it is said, getting the worst of things, started setting fire to
buildings (80.2.3). Finally, the rebellion of mint workers in Rome under Aurelian
is said by Aurelius Victor and the author of the Historia Augusta to have been
repressed with heavy loss of life to the soldiers.90 Victor puts the battle on the
Caelian Hill, and this fact is perhaps confirmed by the radical refurbishment of
the mint in the late third century, which could suggest the battle took place in the
mint or on the slope of the Caelian hill closest to it (Steinby, Lexicon 3.280–281).
These assumptions about the results of military attempts at repression were not
just held by the e´lite in the west of the empire. For Josephus claims that, during
the disorders of 4 b.c., Archelaus dispatched a cohort to seize the ringleaders of
a riot in Jerusalem. The crowd proceeded to stone most of the cohort to death,
and it was only with the use of his entire army that Archelaus repressed the riots
(BJ 2.11–13). Later in the same year, Josephus claims, a crowd in Jerusalem
held its own against a force of Roman soldiers by throwing projectiles from the
top of a porticus in the Temple complex. The Romans only gained the upper
hand after burning down the porticus (BJ 2.39–50 = AJ 17.254–264). Josephus
also mentions in his account of the disorders in Alexandria during the prefecture
of Ti. Julius Alexander that the Alexandrian Jews resisted the Roman forces for
some time, and inflicted casualties on Roman soldiers (BJ 2.495). He also states
that during the disorders of 66, a crowd in Jerusalem actually put a Roman force
to flight by throwing missiles from roofs and by blocking its progress through
narrow alleys (BJ 2.328–329).91
It is difficult to know to what degree these accounts of rioters resisting soldiers
are fictitious. It could be that the perception that crowds at spectacles were
unruly was so ingrained that it was automatically assumed that the disorder
continued, in spite of military presence. One also finds descriptions of crowds
pelting soldiers from rooftops with tiles and stones in authors from Thucydides
onwards,92 although these descriptions are perhaps not similar enough in language
and detail to suggest a literary dependence.93 It has certainly been shown that
many details in Herodian’s account of the battle between a crowd and soldiers in
88 SHA Maximus et Balbinus 10.7, Max. 20.6.
89 Presumably during his praetorian prefecture, in about 222/3 (cf. PIR2 D 169; P Oxy. 31.2565).
90 Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6, SHA Aurel. 38.2–4.
91 See too Joseph. BJ 2.269–270 for a description of another attempt to repress rioting militarily
which was not an unqualified success.
92 Thuc. 2.4, 3.74; Diod. Sic. 13.56.7–8; Livy 34.39.1–7; Sall. Iug. 67.1; Plut. Sull. 9.6; see further
Barry 1996.
93 See Alfo¨ldy 1989: 110, n. 51, commenting on Dopp’s (RE “Herodianus” 3: 955) suggestion that
there was a literary relationship between Thuc. 2.4 and Hdn. 1.12.8–9.
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190 are simply creative extrapolations from—or fictitious additions to—Cassius
Dio’s account of the same incident, and that these additions probably include the
description of the crowd pelting soldiers with stones and roof tiles.94 Herodian
may indeed have projected some of the details of the riots of 238 back onto the
riot of 190, an action which is explained in part by the fact that he was probably an
eyewitness to the events of 238, and in part by his stress on the contrast between
unarmed civilians and armed soldiers (Alfo¨ldy 1989: 110).
In any case, and whatever their historical value, these reports show that
members of the e´lite of the empire believed (rightly or wrongly) that the military
repression of riots could be a bloody and complex affair. It is noteworthy that in
their descriptions of clashes between crowds and soldiers, these engagements are
often called wars95 and the sources often use language that stresses the bloodshed
and the damage to the city. Cassius Dio (64.19.3) claims that the damage visited
on the Flavian forces by stone- and tile-throwing Vitellians contributed directly to
the (suspiciously round) figure of fifty thousand killed during the Flavian assault.
Herodian (1.12.9) claims that in 190, many (pollo’) soldiers were killed by stones
and tiles hurled by the crowd. He also claims that in 238, the fires started by the
soldiers to flush rioters out of the insulae “burned down the greater part of the
city,” an area that was “greater in extent than the entire size of the largest cities
elsewhere,” and thereby impoverished many (pollo’) people.96 The author of
the Historia Augusta life of Maximus and Balbinus reports the matter in similar
terms.97 Cassius Dio (80.2.3) likewise claims that the riot during the lifetime of
Ulpian was a “great dissension” (st‡siw meg‡lh), that many (pollo’) were killed
on both sides, and that the people feared that the fires lit by the soldiers would
destroy the whole city (p‰sa = p—liw). The author of the Historia Augusta and
Aurelius Victor both claim that the rebellion of the mint workers under Aurelian
resulted in the deaths of seven thousand soldiers (Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6; SHA
Aurel. 38.2–4). Victor gives this (rather high) figure to illustrate the seriousness
of the event, and the Historia Augusta cites what purports to be a letter written by
Aurelian in which the emperor claims that the gods have not granted him victory
over the minters without hardship.98
94 Alfo¨ldy (1989: 93–115, esp. 109–110) convincingly rejects the contention of Whittaker (1964:
350–351, 1969–70: 1.83) that Herodian’s account of the fall of Cleander is more reliable at points
than that of Cassius Dio.
95 Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6: . . . bellum . . .(“war”); Hdn. 1.13.1: . . . polmou \mful’ou. . . (“civil war”),
7.11.6: \mful’on polmon . . .; SHA Aurel. 38.2–3: . . . bellum . . . .
96 Hdn. 7.12.6: . . . mgiston mrow tw p—levw t˜ pr \nem}yh . . . (“the fire burned down a very
great part of the city”), §7: tosoton d mrow tw p—levw t˜ pr \lum}nato qw mhdem’an t™n
meg’stvn p—levn `l—klhron dœnasyai t! mrei \jisvynai (“the fire ruined a part of the city
larger than the entire size of any of the other great cities”). Cf. 7.11.6.
97 SHA Maximus et Balbinus 10.7: atque ideo maior pars civitatis periit et multorum divitiae (“and in
this way the greater part of the city was destroyed and also the fortunes of many”).
98 Aur. Vict. Caes. 35.6: . . . bellum fecerant [sc. monetae opifices] usque eo grave, uti per Coelium
montem congressi septem fere bellatorum milia confecerint (“[The mint workers] . . . fought a war so
serious, that having gathered on the Caelian Hill, they killed almost seven thousand soldiers”). SHA
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v. conclusion: riots and imperial ideology
The many reports of riots contained in the sources relevant to the history of
the Roman principate cannot with confidence be used to build a picture of what
the Roman authorities actually tended to do in response to riots. Given the nature
of the phenomenon of rioting and the partisan passions it sparks, the quality of
information at the disposal of the authors of the extant sources cannot inspire
confidence. Further, various motifs run throughout these reports, motifs which
often look conventionalized, and perhaps could even be seen as literary topoi. But
reports of riots do tell us something about e´lite ideas about what should and did
happen when the authorities responded to them.
Reading the sources with an eye to this issue reveals that, whatever may have
happened in practice, our e´lite authors did not believe that the imperial authorities
should (or did) repress rioting only when it threatened the position or dignity
of a particular emperor, magistrate or governor. Rather, the responses of our
authors to the question of riot control were intimately bound up with various
strands of discourse that might be grouped under the rubric of “imperial ideology.”
The emperor (and by extension subordinate imperial officials) were expected to
respond to riots, whatever their nature and goals. This was part of the general
expectation that the emperor should (and did) repress piracy, banditry, and other
threats to public order. The answer to the question of what the imperial authorities
ought to do in response to a riot in a given situation was, in turn, often bound
up with the ideology of clemency and moderation: a good ruler should avoid
the use of force to quell a riot, and instead attempt personal persuasion, thereby
sparing the rioters (and the troops) from the horrors of an engagement between
the crowd and soldiers. It was also felt that, if a leader was forced by the crowd’s
violent behaviour to use military repression, this should be done in moderation,
and should not be a massacre. As for merely verbal demonstrations on the part
of the crowd, it was considered inappropriate for the emperor or subordinate
officials to use military forces to silence it. This view is surely connected with
the general expectation that the emperor should listen to and consider seriously
the shouted petitions of the crowd, especially at public spectacles (Millar 1992:
368–375). Responding to such shouts with a massacre is an example par excellence
of the emperor failing to meet this expectation. The idea that the emperor should
tolerate the jeers of the crowd is also to be linked with the general expectation
that an emperor should overlook mere verbal insults.99
Of course, one does not find a perfectly logical set of ideas about riots: such
perfect consistency is not to be expected when examining the ideologies of many
e´lite authors spread over several centuries. Some authors report riots in a way that
shows little interest in whether it was a violent crowd against which troops were
Aurel. 38.4: apparet nullam mihi a dis immortalibus datam sine difficultate victoriam (“it seems that no
victory has been given by the immortal gods without hardship”).
99 Tac. Ann. 3.49–51; Julian Miso. 355–356, 365d.
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used, or whether soldiers were used in a moderate fashion; this is particularly
the case if an author is focused on the perceived impropriety of the crowd’s
behaviour, or the baseness of crowds in general. Further, the views of various
writers from the east of the empire (particularly those from the earlier part of
the principate) differ from those of their western counterparts on some issues
connected with riot control, whilst being similar on others. This is what we
would expect of a Graeco-Roman governing class that was “partially integrated”
culturally.100 Eastern writers like Philo, Josephus, Dio Chrysostom, and Aelius
Aristides at times stress the importance of local e´lites in preserving order, and
are found presenting military solutions to riots as an absolute last resort. Such
authors assume that the imperial authorities are still interested in whether order
is maintained, and some Jewish writers when describing riots against Jews are
sometimes even found stressing the obligation of these authorities to intervene.
Nevertheless, the general tendency in our eastern sources is ambivalence toward
Roman involvement in riots, particularly military involvement.
As well as often operating within various discourses of “imperial ideologies,”
the reports about riots considered above might help to explain some elements of
official ideology. Whether or not we believe that the permanent stationing of
troops in Rome and various other metropoleis actually represented a revolution
in the maintenance of law and order, the fact remains that many of our ancient
authors are less than enthusiastic about the capacities of troops to repress riots.
These members of the e´lites of the empire evidently believed that attempts at
military riot repression, although always successful in the end, could involve
bloodbaths for soldiers as much as for rioters, and that at times the soldiers’ only
resort was to start burning parts of the city to flush rioters out of the buildings they
were using, a tactic which was decidedly dangerous in a pre-industrial city with no
mechanized fire-fighting apparatus. This belief in the potential destructiveness
of clashes between soldiers and crowds helps to explain the general preference
for the use of personal appeals to quell riots. It also may help to explain both
the elaborate attempts of e´lites to win the favour of the urban masses, and the
measures designed to prevent riots before they occurred. Thus, the apparent
contradiction between the permanent military presence in major cities under the
principate and the continued efforts of emperors and e´lites to win the favour of
the urban masses turns out not to be such a contradiction at all.
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100 The phrase is Millar’s (2002: 71).
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